Security model

• No unauthorized minting - mint authority revoked; supply is fixed.
• No unauthorized reserve withdrawal - SOL leaves the pool only via redemption.
• No double redemption - each wallet's cumulative redeemed SOL is permanent and subtracted from every future claim.
• No supply manipulation - supply is read from the mint, never from mutable state.
• Reentrancy protection - state is updated before transfers; instructions are non-reentrant.
• Integer precision - checked arithmetic, with rounding that favours the pool.
• Atomicity - the payout and the redeemed-total update succeed together or revert together.
• Fee validation - only verified eligible receipts count toward backing.
• No client-side trust - the client never supplies the payout amount.

• Malicious caller attempting to redeem more than their proportional share.
• Flash-loan style manipulation of apparent supply or balance within one slot.
• Stale state: a client estimate used as a binding payout.
• Compromised admin key attempting reserve extraction or parameter abuse.
• External fee infrastructure changes that reduce or stop eligible inflow.
• RPC failure or indexer inconsistency producing misleading displayed values.

Any privileged role, upgrade authority or emergency control that exists in the deployed configuration is disclosed on the protocol page. Preference is for immutable, minimally privileged deployment; where upgradeability exists it is stated openly rather than hidden.

• Unaudited program code.
• Third-party fee infrastructure dependency.
• Market price can trade below backing value indefinitely.
• Irreversible transactions and user error.